fair_trade_for_all
Differences
This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.
| Both sides previous revision Previous revision Next revision | Previous revision | ||
|
fair_trade_for_all [2010/07/02 13:05] dan |
fair_trade_for_all [2019/11/08 10:39] (current) |
||
|---|---|---|---|
| Line 2: | Line 2: | ||
| ====== Introduction ====== | ====== Introduction ====== | ||
| + | |||
| ===== Recent WTO History ===== | ===== Recent WTO History ===== | ||
| Line 13: | Line 14: | ||
| * trade facilitation. | * trade facilitation. | ||
| - | Developing countries, wary of entering another bad agreement after the failures of Doha, have blocked progress on developed countries' | + | Developing countries, wary of entering another bad agreement after the failures of Uruguay, have blocked progress on developed countries' |
| ===== Outline of the Book ===== | ===== Outline of the Book ===== | ||
| Line 407: | Line 408: | ||
| > A blanket proscription against government subsidies to technology (industrial policies) is likely to have an adverse effect on developing countries and, indeed, it is likely in practice to be unfair: the United States conducts its industrial policy largely through the military, which supports a wide variety of technological developments that eventually have important civilian applications. | > A blanket proscription against government subsidies to technology (industrial policies) is likely to have an adverse effect on developing countries and, indeed, it is likely in practice to be unfair: the United States conducts its industrial policy largely through the military, which supports a wide variety of technological developments that eventually have important civilian applications. | ||
| + | |||
| ====== Priorities for a Development Round ====== | ====== Priorities for a Development Round ====== | ||
| Line 452: | Line 454: | ||
| * multilateral enforcement (non-injured parties can also retaliate against an offending member) | * multilateral enforcement (non-injured parties can also retaliate against an offending member) | ||
| * monetisation of sanctions (developing countries can sell the right to sanction to other members for whom the sanction would be more valuable, eg if Nicaragua won a dispute against the US, it could sell the right to impose duties to China or the EU) | * monetisation of sanctions (developing countries can sell the right to sanction to other members for whom the sanction would be more valuable, eg if Nicaragua won a dispute against the US, it could sell the right to impose duties to China or the EU) | ||
| - | * institutional reform | + | * institutional reform: |
| * creation of evaluation unit within the WTO to assess likely impact of measures on developing countries | * creation of evaluation unit within the WTO to assess likely impact of measures on developing countries | ||
| * greater transparency (elimination of the Green Room, etc) | * greater transparency (elimination of the Green Room, etc) | ||
| Line 637: | Line 639: | ||
| * China had to accept an extraordinary right of other members to use safeguards against it (beyond GATT [[http:// | * China had to accept an extraordinary right of other members to use safeguards against it (beyond GATT [[http:// | ||
| * some LDCs have bound export subsidies at zero (far beyond many developed countries' | * some LDCs have bound export subsidies at zero (far beyond many developed countries' | ||
| - | + | ||
| > It seems strange that the WTO's developed country members should force acceding countries, particularly small and poor countries like Cambodia and Nepal, into such strong concessions. | > It seems strange that the WTO's developed country members should force acceding countries, particularly small and poor countries like Cambodia and Nepal, into such strong concessions. | ||
fair_trade_for_all.1278075948.txt.gz ยท Last modified: 2019/11/08 10:39 (external edit)
Page Tools
Except where otherwise noted, content on this wiki is licensed under the following license: CC Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 International
